Brazil: From Major Regional Power to Great Power Status?



Jaime Giménez Sánchez de la Blanca
21/05/2012




Ø  Abstract

In this paper, we analyze and discuss about Brazilian struggle to become a great power. Brazil is recognized as major regional power, but its elite is not satisfied with that. Here, we ask ourselves why Brazil is not recognized as great power, and then we study the solutions that Brazil could implement in order to achieve its goal. Main conclusion is that Brazil must consolidate its regional leadership through Mercosur, and solve its internal imbalances through the strengthening of its institutions.





Ø  Introduction

In discussions of global political development, the South American region has been a long-forgotten region. First, relegated to Iberian colony, and, after, underestimated as “backyard” of the superpower. South America is determined by its geography: isolated by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Nowadays things seem to have changed. South America emerges as a potential economic power. Led by Brazil, the region can increase its influence beyond the Western Hemisphere if Mercosur consolidates. In this paper I will examine the possible rise of Brazil under the current global political condition of order under the hegemony led by US. Therefore, I take the point of departure in GP theory, stating that the stabilization of the global strategic architecture (Kondrup, GP4) caused by the shift from violence interdependence to functional interdependence (Kondrup, GP7) has allowed Brazil to increase its economic capabilities and, thus, improved its possibilities of becoming a great power.

Brazil is a major regional power that aims to increase its status. Unifying its region under its strong leadership may be the necessary step to improve its global influence. Brazil is willing to access the global polity core. In 2001, 99% of Brazilian ruling elite said that becoming a world leader was a main goal of the country, while 76% considered important become part of the UNSC (Volgy et. al. 2011, 170). Now, Brazil needs to convince the rest of powers that it is prepared to order the globe.

Brazil, as an emergent power, struggles to achieve that goal. The question is: is Brazil on the right way of passage? Answering this question is the purpose of this paper. To that end, we will frame the problem in Global Polity theory, and, after that, we will analyze and discuss Brazilian geopolitical situation in order to reach some conclusions.


Ø  Problem

Brazil is widely recognized as a major regional power due to its ability to forge conflict and corporation in South America. But this status is not enough for its expectations. Brazil sees itself as capable to reach great power status, and it is in a continuous struggle to achieve that aim. In this paper, we will try to explain the reasons why Brazil is not yet qualified to improve its geopolitical status. The inability to project power beyond its region undermines the credibility of Brazil among its neighbors. This gives rise to weaker countries like Venezuela, whose aspirations to become the leader of an alternative to the capitalist system, calls into question even the leadership of Brazil in the region. However, economic capabilities of Brazil are much larger than any other South American state. Also, Brazilian leaders have tried to gain influence in the global decision-making spheres. Brazil has risen as one of the emergent powers that presumably will lead the world in some decades. Thus, Brazil meets all the conditions to become a great power, but it has not been able to achieve that status yet.

According to GP Theory, Brazil accepts the status quo of the current international system. Brazil benefits from the interdependency games of the global economy. Its economic growth is highly dependent on the stability of the world strategic architecture. Although Brazil would like to improve its status, it does not call into question the main characteristic of the current world order. Brazil is a liberal democracy in line with the capitalist globalization. Nevertheless, in the last decade Brazilian President Lula has slightly changed the discourse, trying to present Brazil as the leader of the developing world, struggling for its rights against the West. In any case, this change is more rhetorical than material, because Brazil’s respect for the established global institutions remains unchanged. Also, Brazil is still an ally of the USA. Even though the regional rivalry has strongly increased in the last decades, Brazil still needs the military support of the superpower. The USA, for its part, wants Brazil to stabilize and order the region against potential threats like Venezuela.

So, if Brazil wants to become a great power, it needs to improve the domination over its region, and, then, be able to influence the global decisions. Mercosur is a key point on these aspirations. This organization has allowed Brazil to finish the rivalry with Argentina, and begin a mutual cooperation. This is crucial for Brazil, as Argentina used to be the major regional power, and now Brazil has replaced it as South American leader, and also has achieved its support within Mercosur. If the entire continent is someday united under the umbrella of a Brazil-led Mercosur, Brazil would be much closer of its goal: great power status.

Becoming a permanent member of the UNSC would be an undeniable proof of the rising status of Brazil. Taking into account current global situation is not unlikely that would happen. UN system is under reforms in order to gain legitimacy in the new global scenario. Rising powers like India and Brazil, and consolidated ones like Japan, want to entry in the global polity core. However, as they need the approval of the current UNSC members, it is not likely that India and Japan could become permanent members of the Council, because China see them as regional threats and will never allow this to happen. So Brazil can take advantage of its relatively isolated geographical position, and being selected to enter the UNSC.


Ø  Method

To write this paper, I have used different kind of sources. Mainly, bibliography consists of Global Polity texts and books and articles specialized in Brazilian and South American politics. As analyzing a political entity in Global Polity requires investigating the self-image of the object of study, the methodology followed to write this paper is based on discourse analysis. Nonetheless, to support our argument, we have also searched for quantitative data and statistical sources.


Ø  Global Polity Framing

The current stability in the global political order is key to grasp the dynamics of global polity. Interstate wars have been replaced by military actions coordinated from intergovernmental organizations such as the UN. After a period of instability that Kondrup names the international state of exception (1999-2006), world appear to be stabilized (Kondrup, GP4). The elite suppression of China, India, Russia and Brazil by US and EU in concert, together within the solid partnership of NATO members and substantial ties with Japan, has led to a global hegemony that maintains a relatively stable world. Main global polity decisions are taken in the Security Council of the UN. Since 2006, civic homogeneity between elite states has made the decision-making processes in the global arena easier. However, in February 2012, Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution about Syria. This has created some degree of uncertainty on the future of global polity. In reference to Brazil, this country is pressuring to achieve a permanent seat in the Security Council, because Brazilian elites understand the importance of being part of this privileged club.

The stabilization of the strategic architecture has a main reason: the rising importance of functional interdependence on the expense of violence interdependence as the prime feature of interactions between states. Function interdependencies, where states work together to exploit their relative advantages leads to economic growth which brings prosperity, and thus increases the material capabilities of the states, which is essential to improve their position in the global order. Hence, the emerging nations prefer to maintain the global stability (as they benefit from it), instead of challenging it. This is crucial to understand the global polity. Neither China, nor India, nor Brazil, are interested in subverting the current global order. For the moment, they prefer a world controlled by the superpower and its allies, as their development depends on the security of the trade routes. Thus, as the states enough powerful to challenge the status quo prefer to accept it because it favors their growth; interdependency games are the main factor of stabilization of the global political order (Duedney 2007).



Another aspect that has helped the stabilization of world order is the unipolarity. The US displays its power, articulating the world order in its own interest (Ikenberry 2007). Nonetheless, as we said, the superpower has been able to shape a world in which the emergent powers prefer stability than instability.

However, as Duedney remarks (Duedney 2007), the liberal order based on function interdependencies needs a political form to work correctly. This means that the subjection of the states to a common rule is an essential requirement to avoid anarchy. Some degree of institutionalization is needed. In other case, the realist view of the anarchic international community will be true again, and conflicts will be solved mainly by interstate wars. Duedney’s Republican Security Theory (Duedney 2007) advocates the subjection to the rule and, maybe, the establishment of a global government that supervise its enforcement. In all cases, this possibility is still quite far of coming true. Nowadays states are not yet prepared to accept that extremely high institutionalization. For the moment, the benchmark of Jurisdictional Structure in the global polity seems far from being overcome.

Another fundamental element in the study of global polity is sovereignty. As one of its four basic institutions (together with war, balance of power, and diplomacy), understanding sovereignty is essential to grasp global polity dynamics. The concept of sovereignty has four dimensions (Krasner 2001): interdependence sovereignty (ability of a government to regulate the movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas across its borders), domestic sovereignty (de facto internal domination), international legal sovereignty (recognition by other states), and Westphalian sovereignty (autonomy).
Interdependence sovereignty is especially interesting for my analysis. This kind of sovereignty is only achieved through trustworthiness. As the states have to interact with each other in the global arena, they need to be trusted by the others. When a state is reliable, then it has cultural capital. This facilitates getting into the core circles¸ and thus improving status in global polity. Brazil, for instance, have gained a lot of cultural capital in the core, as it respects the global political and economic institutions. But, as Brazil also maintains an independent position in global policy forums, it has gained influence among its South American neighbors as well.

Analyzing the status of Brazil requires a study of both global and regional levels, but also local. To improve its global role, Brazil needs to fulfill some regional and local goals. As Brazilian socio-geographic concretion is relatively isolated of the other powers, it can develop its relations more freely than the rest. Even so, Brazil, as the whole Latin America, is in the “backyard” of the superpower. Brazilian interests are somehow in conflict with those of the US. In its struggle to order its region, Brazil has to gain influence to the detriment of the hegemon. This regional rivalry with the US may carry problems for the global aspirations of Brazil, as the support of the superpower may be decisive for the achievement of Brazilian goals. In addition, in the local level Brazil must solve the huge social, economic and political gap existing among its population. Polity divisions and closed elites are important obstacles in the way to improve its global status. Brazil cannot be considered as a developed country if it does not reduce the severe inequalities existing in its society. Hence, both regional and local levels have an important role in the status of Brazil in global polity.

In short, the promotion of Brazil is the result of its successful economic policies and diplomacy, which have allowed the country to take advantage of the stability of the global order, caused by the prominence of interdependence sovereignty in global polity.


Ø  Analysis and discussion

During his second mandate, Brazilian President Lula made clear the aspirations of the country to become major power. Between 2007 and 2011, Lula pursued a variety of steps to improve the role of Brazil. The two main objectives of the Brazilian leader were obtaining a permanent seat in the Security Council of the UN, and broadening and deepening the regional alliance of Mercosur (Love et al. 2009).

However, these high expectations of Brazilian elite are not new. Already in 1943, Brazilian foreign minister Oswaldo Aranha “saw Brazil and the United States as cosmic and universal nations, whose futures could only be continental and worldwide. Realistically he knew that Brazil was still a weak country economically and military”, but he had no doubt that with a capital and population which would come from the country’s natural growth, or would flow to it after the war, it would be inevitably one of the great economic and political powers of the world” (McCann 1973, 304).

Thus, Brazil has traditionally seen itself as a potential great power. Lately, Brazilian economic capabilities have grown spectacularly, bringing closer the possibility of reaching the desired status. Nevertheless, Brazil is still far from achieving its aim.

According to Volgy et al. (2011, 22), the requirements of a state to be recognized as a great power are:

a)    “Having unusual capabilities”
b)    “Pursue unusually abroad and expansive foreign policies”.
c)    “Seeking to influence the course of international affairs relatively independently”.

Also, it is also necessary being perceived by other states as unusually powerful and willing to influence global affairs, and acting consistent with that perception (Volgy et al 2011, 22).

So, improving status in global polity is not just a matter of material resources; a consistent behavior of the state representatives according to the status they want to achieve is also needed.

As we have seen, Brazilian elites have the will to make their country a major power. The problem is that Brazil does not fulfill all the requisites formulated by Volgy et al. Although economic capabilities of Brazil are indisputable (7th GDP in the world[i]), Brazil is unable to entirely control its own region. Also, although the rest of powers recognize the regional leadership of Brazil, they view with indifference its participation in the global decision-making processes. Its military dependence of the US, together with its internal socio-economic inequalities, undermines the capacity of Brazil to present itself as a fully autonomous and developed actor. However, it seems that Brazil is improving its military capabilities. As Holtom et al. (2012, 6) recall, Brazil has placed “significant orders in recent years including licensed production deals with France for 4 Scorpène class submarines, 1 SNBR nuclear-powered submarine and 50 EC-725 helicopters, as well as a licensed production deal with Italy for over 2000 VBTP Guarani APCs. Four of the helicopters had been delivered by the end of 2011, while deliveries of the armoured vehicles and submarines are due to start in 2012 and 2017, respectively. Brazil made no decision on awarding long-discussed deals for combat aircraft and naval systems but did order three VT-90m offshore patrol vessels from the UK”. So, Brazil is willing to improve its military capabilities towards ceasing to be dependent on the US and improve its global status.

Regional integration

After the end of the Cold War, the world lived a wave of regionalism (Schirm 2002). In 1991, four South American states signed the Treaty of Asunción, initiating the project of Mercosur. This is an organization sponsored by Brazil, who opted for the regional integration in order to open the neighbors’ markets and expand its influence over them. If Mercosur success, Brazil would have forged a strong leadership in South America, and this would facilitate progress toward its aim of improving its geopolitical status.

For the moment, Mercosur has only five full members (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela), but it also has special agreements with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. Mexico participates as an observer. Mercosur aims to create a common market to promote the economic growth of its members. It was the response of the South American states to the globalization process, trying to avoid marginalization in the global economy (Buzan 2003).

Mercosur was only possible due to the cooling of relations between Brazil and Argentina. After almost two centuries of rivalry for the domination of South America, both regional powers gave up in their fight and began to cooperate. A key step in this process was the creation of the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in 1986, with which both states renounced to develop nuclear energy for military purposes. Argentina and Brazil signed a protocol that allowed each other to verify the compliance of the agreement. Transitions to democracy in both countries, and the consequent weakening of both armies, facilitated the easing of historical tension, and made possible the establishment of their trading partnership (Buzan 2003). Now, trading operations between both countries have multiplied (Schirm 2002). However, leadership of Brazil in its region is a reality only because of Argentinian economic stagnation during the same period of the “Brazilian economic miracle” (1968-1974). In fact, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, the three buffer states which are now de facto satellites of Brazilian economy, where once controlled by Argentinian capital (Buzan 2003). Today, Brazil and Argentina are allies that cooperate to spur their region.

The main challenge of Brazil in its region consists on building trust among its neighbors, so they accept it as their representative on the global level. This would consolidate Brazilian leadership in South America and would improve its influence capacity in global polity institutions. However, this goal is far from being satisfied. The condition of regional leader was placed in doubt when some neighbors voted against Brazilian candidature for a permanent seat on the Security Council (Love et al. 2009). Searching for a solution to this problem, Brazil has taken some steps in order to gain confidence of the rest of South American states. For example, Lula implemented the “diplomacy of generosity”, inviting Brazilian companies to import products from its neighbors, even though they might be more expensive (Love et al. 2009). In the same way, Brazil accepted to be the largest contributor to FOCEM, the development fund for the poorest countries of Mercosur.

Apart from Argentina, the other big rival of Brazil is the US. Although Brazil depends on the military power of the hegemon, it also represents a challenge for its protector (Arceneaux et al. 2005). For the moment, Brazil lacks of enough military resources to defend itself, so it has to seek the defense provided by the US. Nevertheless, Brazil tries to satisfy its own interests, although they can collide with American ones. Mercosur is an example of the clashing interests between Brazil and the US. Brazil is trying to organize the South American region through the integration of the sub-continent. Multilateralism is the way chosen by the Brazilian leaders to reinforce their leadership in the region. For its part, the US continues with bilateralism, seeking to reach agreements with each state separately. However, Mercosur treaty prevents member states from bilateral trading arrangements (Brown 2010). Moreover, Mercosur was launched by Brazil as a prevention mechanism against American project Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Brazil wants to avoid the penetration of the superpower in the Southern Cone. And, for the moment, it has succeeded in this task (with the exception of Chile). The challenge for Brazil now is reinforcing Mercosur, and extending it to the Andean region, where the influence of the US is greater.

In last decades, different regional integration attempts have taken place in Latin America[ii], apart from Mercosur. ALBA, a recently-created regional organization could be a threat for Brazilian interests. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) was created by Venezuela and Cuba in 2004. Later, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador joined the treaty. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was the promoter of this project, which aimed to be an alternative to the American FTAA. ALBA is said to be the first integration agreement based on social and not only economic purposes (Hart – Landsberg 2010). Some leftist governments of Latin America have joined this organization, based on ideological assumptions. ALBA is clearly anti-American and it is also against free market rules (Brown 2010). The main problem for Brazil is that, if more and more countries join the organization, Venezuela could dispute its regional leadership. Furthermore, ALBA promotes alternative economic and political ideas which are not shared by Brazil. This is a clear challenge to Brazilian regional hegemony. ALBA, together with the US influence in South America, makes it improbable that Brazil could extend its domination over its region in the near future (Volgy et al. 2011).

Summing up, a successful Mercosur would have a dual function for Brazilian interests. On the one hand, it would unify the region under Brazilian leadership. On the other hand, it would give credibility to Brazil in the global decision-making circles. If the project finally succeeds, Brazil would be much closer to becoming a great power. But Mercosur will have to struggle with the threats of ALBA and the US penetration.

Regional leadership

Brazil leads its region, no question about that. However, its neighbors do not have total confidence in Brazil. Although they accept Brazilian leadership to design new institutions like Mercosur, or to mediate regional conflicts, neighbors doubt on the hypothetical great power status of Brazil (Volgy et al. 2011).

Mercosur is a key point, but the mediation role of Brazil is also quite important to understand the regional leadership of the country. Brazil was mediator after the armed conflict between Peru and Ecuador in 1995 (Roett 1999). The major regional power guaranteed the ceasefire after skirmishes that took place in the border of those countries due to a territorial dispute. Both Andean countries accepted Brazilian mediation to solve the conflict. This is a clear indicator of the leading role of Brazil in its region, as both neighbors trusted it in that critical situation.

Another indicator of the willingness of Brazil of ordering its surroundings was showed in Haiti. Brazil led the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Although Haiti is not in South America, it is part of the Brazilian meta-region. Lula wanted to show both to its neighbors and to international society that Brazil was prepared to improve its global status (Love et al. 2009).

Also, Brazil is an active player in meta-regional organizations and meetings like the OAS and the Ibero-American Summits.

Thus, Brazil has showed its ability to solve most of recent regional conflicts and enjoys leadership in its region, yet it must increase in order to achieve Brazilian aims.

Institutional underdevelopment: the main problem of Brazil

Latin America and the Caribbean is the world’s most unequal region (UNDP 2010). In South America, Uruguay is the country with the best Gini coefficient (39), while Bolivia is the worst (58.2)[iii]. The lack of equality is related to institutional underdevelopment in the region. As jurisdictional structure is sick, government policies do not reach further than the highest social strata. This also affects to territorial distribution of wealth: rural areas remain much poorer than the urban ones due to the inability of states to implement their measures further than cities. These huge imbalances make it difficult the socio-economic development in South American countries.

In the Geographic concretion scale (Kondrup, GP), Brazil does not get beyond the Polity Division threshold. Brazilian extremely closed elites, together with the lack of wealth distribution, relegate Brazil to a non-developed country. Although it is the seventh economy in the world, Brazil cannot be considered as developed until it does not overcome this challenge[iv].

Brazilian elite is divided in ruling class and political elite (Roett 1999). The ruling class is composed of large land-owners, who manage production of sugar, coffee and meat. As land distribution is extremely unequal, just a few families compound the traditional ruling class (Schneider 1991). For its part, political elite manages the “patrimonial state” and enjoys the patronage benefits of political power (Roett 1999). As their objectives are complementary, both groups work together to maintain internal status quo. Ruling class is focused in preventing any reform of the land tenure. Political elite aim to gain public office. Brazilian elite can be permeable, but the aspirants must accept the corrupt rules of the patrimonial state, which final goal is the self-perpetuation of the elites (Roett 1999).

However, in lasts years some changes have occurred. Groups like the army have lost part of their power in favour of new emergent classes. Especially after 1964, the military regime promoted new groups, in its effort to reform Brazilian economy. This was called military developmentalism (Worth et al. 2009). A new class of young and better educated entrepreneurs from the agro-industry sector emerged and assumed leadership positions. This was the basis of the economic take-off.

The problem of Brazil is that the outstanding economic development has not been accompanied by the same degree of social development. Although Brazilian inequality has decreased (Gini index fell from 60.7 in 1998 to 51.9 in 2012)[v], Brazil is still a quite unjust country. For example, its education system is ranked in 114th position of the world (Love et al. 2009). This fact gives an idea about the huge social problem in Brazil.

Also, there are regional imbalances that hobble Brazilian progress. Great economic influence of Sao Paulo distorts development of the poorest regions (Schneider 1991). Half of the wealth generated in the country comes from the states of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, the three of them located in the South East (Hagopian 1996).

Finally, the third problem related to Brazilian institutional underdevelopment is the inability of state mechanisms to ensure maintenance of law and order. Organized crime and drug trafficking are huge problems that ravage the whole Latin America. Brazil is no exception, and must solve these internal problems in order to satisfy its global expectations. If Brazil could defeat its internal drug crime, and also help to eradicate it in other countries like Colombia, Brazil would inspire a lot of confidence of its neighbors. Thus, fighting lack of order both in local and regional level, would improve Brazilian possibilities of becoming a great power.

Brazil: leader of the South?

Brazil host diplomatic missions from 134 countries, and receives state visits disproportionate to other countries in the region (Volgy et al. 2011). This gives an idea of the geopolitical weight of Brazil. Its social capital is strengthening in the same way as the number of its allies grows. Mercosur and UNASUR are proof of that. But Brazil is also gaining friends beyond its region. In the last decade, Brazil has cooperated with lusophone countries in Africa. Brazilian penetration in Angola and Mozambique is evident (Love et al. 2009). Brazil is also part of the G-20, G-3 and the BRICS, so it is expanding its soft power base.

Brazil respects main institutions of global polity, but it also raise an independent voice to defend the rights of the developing countries. Brazil forged its reputation as representative of the South in the WTO. Brazil lobbied for a fairer world trade during the Round of Doha, especially demanding the lift of agriculture tariffs on the developed world (Lassiter 2007).

Lula reinforced South-South relations at the same time as he distanced himself from the United States. Since the 60s, Brazil has had and independent foreign policy from the hegemon (Roett 1999). Under Lula, this trend was accentuated, probably trying to gain trust of South American neighbors (most of them under leftist governments). However, Brazil has never totally separate from the US, as is dependent of its military protection. Lula carried out an “activist and progressive diplomacy” focusing on issues related to the South like environment or fighting AIDS. In the same way, current Brazilian foreign policy is based in three D’s: “Decolonization, Development and Disarmament”.

Brazil is also critic with R2P doctrine, and prefers the “principle of non-indifference” (Volgy et al. 2011). Brazilian delegation abstained in the voting on the 1973 resolution of the Security Council that allowed the intervention in Libya. Neither Brazil supported wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq (Volgy et al. 2011). Brazil jealously guards Westphalian sovereignty[vi]. Authorities fear the humanitarian interventions of the superpower. This is because, as environmental securitization is increasing on relevance, Brazil fears the internationalization of the Amazonia, which could justify a foreign intervention on its own soil. Instead, Brazil claims for the securitization of social development, because “social development is the condition for economic development and constitutes the first line of national defense and maintenance of sovereignty” (Buzan 2003, 322).

A long-held ambition of Brazil is achieving a permanent seat in the Security Council. Brazil tried to play a major role in the League of Nations and in the early United Nations. Brazil failed in both attempts. Now, it has retaken that ambition. Brazil argues that the UN must be renovated in order to represent the modern world and gaining legitimacy. Lula’s rhetoric consisted on presenting Brazilian candidature as a common interest of the whole Third World (Love et al. 2009). Now, with the mentioned unwillingness of China to accept India and Japan in the UNSC, Brazil can take advantage and present itself as the ideal candidate.


Ø  Conclusions
Brazil is a major regional power that aims to reach great power status. Although it possesses the economic potentialities, Brazil lacks the necessary influence in its own region and in the global arena to achieve its goal.

Brazil has benefited from the swift in global polity from violence interdependence to functional interdependencies. Brazil has taken advantage of the economic globalization and it is likely to become one of the top 5 world economies in few decades (Love et al. 2009).

Brazilian elites see their own country as capable to order global polity, beyond the limits of its region. This is a fundamental step to improve its status. However, as the rest of powers do not see Brazil prepared to be a great power, there is status inconsistency (Volgy et al. 2011).

Hence, Brazil is seeking to change that perception to become part of the global polity core. Brazil is firmly committed to obtain a permanent seat of the Security Council of the UN, the maximum organ of decision-making of global polity. As it tries to represent the demands of the developing world, Brazil could be seen by the current great powers as the cornerstone that would give more legitimacy to the global polity system.

If Brazil manages to strengthen Mercosur, it will increase its influence over its region.  This is the key step towards its goal, as a strong regional leadership would be the perfect visiting card to present to the rest of the world, in order to be perceived as prepared to improve its geopolitical status. Moreover, consolidating Mercosur would permanently reduce the threats posed by ALBA and the US penetration in South America. Maintaining friendly relationships with Argentina may be a key factor in this issue.

In addition, solving its internal institutional problem is also extremely important. Reducing socio-economic inequalities, together with ensuring law enforcement all over Brazilian territory, would strengthen a lot the perception which the relevant states have of it.


Ø  Policy recommendation
The address to the Roussef administration based on the current research would be to use all the diplomatic resources to strengthen Mercosur in order to achieve a strong alliance that unifies the region under Brazilian leadership. This could also help to reduce the dependency of the US and enable Brazil to carry out an entirely independent foreign policy. Roussef should also work hard to reduce internal inequalities.


Ø  Bibliography

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Ø  Notes


[i] World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2010+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc
[ii] South America is known for the high number of integration failures. Many organizations have been created but very few have reached their aims. The aforementioned FTAA and others like the Latin American Integration Association, the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), UNASUR, CELAC or ALBA, are some examples of these attempts of integration. Not all of them have failed, for instance, the CAN is a custom union area formed by Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. It is perceived as a competitor of Mercosur, and the aim of Brazil is attracting its members to the Southern Cone organization. However, CAN and Mercosur are both part of UNASUR, an intergovernmental organization that integrates the two existing customs unions. Brazil is also leading UNASUR, and it could be an important instrument for its regional aspirations.

[iii] CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html
[iv] As a country cannot be a superpower with 90% of poor among its population, Brazil must solve this social problem in order to reach its geopolitical goals.

[v] Ibídem
[vi] However, Brazil signed the Non Proliferation Treaty, which is discriminatory with sovereign equality of states.

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